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“This patent was applied for in 1879 and granted in 1895. [] While [Selden] 
withheld his patent, the public learned from independent inventors all that it could 
teach. [] But the patentee acted wholly within his rights. He merely took 
advantage of the delays which the law permitted him.￿     
  
  Judge Noyes, Columbia Motor Car Company vs. C. A. Duerr & Company (1911) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When George Selden￿s patent for a ￿Road Engine￿ issued from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 1895, vehicle manufacturers recognized it for 
the threat it was:  within a few years, Selden￿s patent was commanding royalties of 1.25% 
on the retail value of every automobile sold in the United States and had sparked a 
reorganization of the fledgling industry.
2  But Selden had not invented his ￿Road Engine￿ 
during the 1890s, or even during the 1880s.  His original patent application had been 
made in 1879.  Selden had used the continuation procedure available to patentees to keep 
the application hidden from competitors for sixteen years while the technology￿and 
industry￿developed.  Upon issue in 1895, competitor firms that had been using the 
Selden technology for years were suddenly forced to disgorge earnings, or face the 
substantial threat of being shuttered. 
The case of George Selden￿s patent is an example of a larger phenomenon:  the 
use by patentees of complementary appropriability mechanisms to accomplish strategic 
goals.  As knowledge assets are increasingly recognized as an important means of gaining 
competitive advantage, scholarly attention has focused on the protection of knowledge 
assets from competitive rivals, with necessary reference to the appropriability regime and 
intellectual property protections (Teece, 1986).  While individual mechanisms such as 
secrecy and patenting have been studied in isolation, few attempts have been made to 
describe and test the manner in which different mechanisms may complement or 
substitute for one another, and the manner in which these interactions create opportunities 
for patentees to accomplish strategic goals.   
  This paper will examine the continuation, a procedure available under the Patent 
Act allowing patent applicants to delay a patent￿s issue, and thus prolong the period of 
secrecy prior to disclosure.  It is notable that continuation applications are both 
extensively used and acutely understudied:  my data analysis demonstrates that, in some 
U.S. patent issue-years, more than one in four issued patents have had a continuation in 
their application lineage, and that in some sectors this rate has reached greater than three 
in four.  Because the use of these procedures is costly, their prevalence in patenting is a 
puzzle that raises several questions.  First, what are the determinants of firms￿ use of the 
continuation application in patenting?  And, second, how does the firm￿s use of 
continuation patenting drive firm performance? 
                                                 
2 Selden had sold his patent 549,160 in 1899 to a syndicate for $10,000 and 20% of any royalties.  Early 
manufacturers who had originally seen the Selden patent as a threat formed a cartel around the patent, the 
Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers, which limited membership and licenses to manufacture 
under the Selden patent.    2
The limited prior literature on continuation applications has suggested several 
possible explanations for applicants￿ use of the continuation in patenting.  The classic 
policy justification for maintaining the continuation procedure is to afford applicants an 
opportunity to correct drafting errors￿styled here an ￿uncertainty￿ continuation.  
Another hypothesis suggests that lengthy continuing applications ￿wear down￿ Patent 
Office employees who initially resist awarding the patent￿styled here a ￿junk￿ 
continuation.  Yet another hypothesis suggests that applicants use the continuation to 
keep patents hidden in order to engage in economic hold-up after markets have 
developed￿styled here a ￿submarine￿ continuation.  I add to these explanations a fourth:  
the secrecy continuation.  
I argue that the use of the continuation procedure affords patent applicants a 
strategic opportunity.  Continuation applications allow the patentee to file additional 
applications upon identical or amended disclosures, thereby preserving an early priority 
date for the invention while protecting an extended period of secrecy against competitors.  
A strategic opportunity arises from the added term of secrecy that the continuation 
procedure affords to patent applicants.  This period of secrecy, may be a complement to 
the act of patenting itself.   
This paper employs data on the use by firms of continuation applications in the 
United States from 1975-1994.  It is organized as follows.  Part two describes the 
continuation procedure and the motivations for its practice by firms.  Parts three and four 
analyze the advantages stemming from continuation application strategies and present 
some testable implications.  Parts five and six present the methodology and results.  Part 
seven concludes.  
 
2.  Continuation patenting:  Foundational characteristics 
  In the United States, inventors enter into a complex application process when 
seeking a patent.  Procedurally, the application for a utility patent
3 must be filed within 
one year of the invention’s public use or publication
4 with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO or ￿Patent Office￿) and must contain an adequate description 
with one or more claims.
5  Before the patent issues, the Patent Office ensures that the 
invention covers patentable subject matter,
6 is useful,
7 novel,
8 and not obvious.
9  The 
                                                 
3 While the vast majority of US patents--and the focus in this paper--are the so-called Utility patents 
authorized by 35 USC §101, patents are also available on Plants (35 USC §161) and Designs (35 USC 
§171). 
4 35 USC §102(b). 
5 35 USC §112, 113, 114.  The "written description" requirement is intended to allow any person skilled in 
the art to either make or use the invention.  See Permutit v. Graver Corp., 284 US 52 (1931)(finding that the 
absence of any writing was an insufficient description when only drawings were provided).  Claims are 
intended to delimit the subject-matter that constitutes the invention.  See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line 
Mfg., 351 F.2d 546 (7
th Cir. 1965)(holding that withholding information from the claims failed to 
adequately describe the invention). 
6 35 USC §101.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980)(determining that man-made living 
micro-organisms are patentable subject-matter). 
7 35 USC §101.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 US 519 (1966)(upholding examiner’s determination that a the 
output of a chemical process was not useful if merely similar to a useful compound). 
8 35 USC §101, 102.  See Jamesbury v. Litton Industrial, 756 F.2d 1556 (CAFC 1985)(finding that an 
invention was "novel" when no prior art was precisely equivalent).   3
patent examiner, a Patent Office employee with specialized technical knowledge, is the 
arbiter of these requirements.  Prosecution of the patent has been characterized as a "give-
and-take-affair," with negotiation and re-negotiation between the patentee and the patent 
examiner that ordinarily continues for an average of 2-3 years (Merges, et al., 1997).
10  
This mean statistic, however, fails to illuminate many abnormally long pendency periods 
in the tail of the distribution.  Applicants routinely use a procedural mechanism￿the 
continuation application￿to postpone patents￿ issue. 
  In order to understand the full implications of the continuation, it is necessary to 
understand two key concepts:  ￿Priority￿ and ￿non-disclosure.￿  In the U.S. ￿first to 
invent￿ patent system, the filing of a patent application gives the applicant ￿priority,￿ a 
government-sanctioned presumption that the invention is superior to later-filed 
applications by technology competitors.
11  Because prior to 1999 an application remained 
secret until ￿disclosed￿ upon publishing when issued, applicants enjoyed common-law 
trade secret protection on inventions during the pendency of their applications.
12   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The continuing patent application permits an applicant to avoid the 
implementation of a patent examiner￿s issue decision by renewing at least some portion 
of an original application.  As defined here, a continuing patent application may be of 
three types:  the continuation, the continuation-in-part, and the division (Figure 1).
13  The 
￿continuation￿ application discloses the identical invention claimed in the prior ￿parent￿ 
application, with a requirement that no extraneous matter be disclosed in the follow-up 
application.
14  The ￿continuation-in-part￿ application allows the addition of some new 
matter to the original application￿although the benefit of early priority is awarded only 
for the original disclosures contained in the new application.  A ￿division￿ occurs when 
the original application contains more than one independent invention.  The USPTO 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 35 USC §103.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US 1 (1966)(finding an invention invalid on grounds 
that the improvement would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art). 
10 Lemley (1994) found an average length of 864 days (2.37 years) for 2,081 patents issued on December 
27, 1994.  There is reason to believe that patent prosecution terms may have shortened for applications 
made after 1994 (See Lemley, 1994), although Allison & Lemley suggests that pendency has not fallen in 
the years immediately following the passage of the Act (2000). 
11 The USPTO considers that the invention was reduced-to-practice by the application date.  Competitors 
claiming earlier invention must show why they themselves were not diligent in reducing the invention to 
practice or can otherwise justify delaying the application.  Public policy favors the early disclosure of 
inventions.  This underlies the requirement for ￿reasonable diligence￿ in reducing an invention to practice, 
not unlike the requirement that, to avoid a holding of suppression of concealment, there be no unreasonable 
delay in filing an application once there has been a reduction to practice.  Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382 
(CCPA, 1977), quoted in Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624 (CAFC, 1987).   
12 The applicant is ￿promised that merely by soliciting, before the Patent Office, [patent protection for his 
secret invention] he is not giving up his common-law rights.  Though the Patent Office may refuse to issue a 
patent, it must do nothing to jeopordize even an unsuccessful applicant￿s common-law rights.￿  Irons & 
Steel v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
13 The continuation and continuation-in-part are authorized under 35 USC § 120 ￿Benefit of earlier filing 
date in the United States.￿  Divisions are authorized under 35 USC § 121 ￿Divisional applications.￿ 
14 The fee required to request a continuing application is no higher than that for filing a first application￿
$710 in 2001, and $355 for small entities.  37 C.F.R. 17(e).   4
allows the applicant to ￿elect￿ one of these inventions while filing second and subsequent 
disclosed inventions separately￿and generally later in time.  So long as the later 
applications disclosing the non-elected inventions satisfy legal requirements, they, like 
the continuation and continuation-in-part applications, benefit from the earliest filing 
date.
15 
Continuation applications of these types permit an applicant to adopt the date of 
an earlier application still pending within the Patent Office.
16  The sine qua non of the 
continuation is that both the early and the new applications must disclose the same 
invention.  Because earlier applications may be abandoned by the applicant freely, the 
invention can remain hidden for extended periods of time.   There is no limit to the 
number of times this abandonment may occur, and thus chains of continuations may 
develop, having the effect of postponing the patent issue, in some cases for decades.
17   
In 1995, and again in 1999, Congress made changes to the Patent Act aimed, at 
least partly, at eliminating applicants￿ incentives to use continuations.  The 1995 
modification
18 increased the patent term from 17 to 20 years but began measuring the 
patent term from the application-date instead of the issue-date, thus forcing the applicant 
using continuation patenting to ￿trade off￿ ex ante secrecy for ex post protection.
19  This 
disincentive was compounded in 1999 when Congress
20 required that applications be 
published after 18-months, bringing the U.S. law into harmony with the patent laws of the 
major patenting jurisdictions.
21  These modifications to the U.S. patenting regime have 
                                                 
15 Continuation applications have been available to patentees in the United States at least since 1863.  In 
Godfrey v. Eames, 68 U.S. 317 (1863), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Patent Act of 1836 to allow 
continuation applications, in that case when the original application was abandoned on the same day that the 
new continued application was filed.  The use of continuing applications was also upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938) and General Talking Pictures Corp. 
v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).   
16 The application must meet certain conditions.  Under 35 USC § 120, a patent application is entitled to 
adopt the filing date of a ￿parent￿ application when (1) both applications disclose the same invention; (2) 
both applications are filed by the same inventor; (3) both applications are simultaneously co-pending; (4) 
the earlier application meets the disclosure requirements of 35 USC § 112; and (5) the later application 
contains a specific reference to the earlier application.  Sampson v. Ampex Corp. (1971, DC NY), 333 F. 
Supp. 59, aff￿d. (2
nd Cir. NY) 463 F2d 1042.  The language of 35 USC § 120 was initially adopted in the 
Patent Act of 1952, and legislative history suggests that the section was intended to write existing legal 
practice on the issue into the statute.  In re Henriksen, 55 C.C.P.A. 1384 (1968). 
17 See, for instance, Jerome Lemelson￿s U.S. patent 5,283,641, Apparatus and methods for automated 
analysis, issued February 1, 1994.  The priority date of this patent was December 24, 1954, and there were 
no fewer than eleven continuations and divisions in this patent￿s chain while it languished in the patent 
office for 39 years. 
18 The legislation was offered and passed in 1994 as part of the fast-track vote on the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The law￿s provisions did not take effect until 1995 so it 
will be termed the ￿1995 Act.￿ 
19 The impact upon continuation applications is provided in 35 USC 154(c).  For patents in force on or with 
application dates prior to June 8, 1995, the patent term is the longer of 20 or 17 years as calculated under 
their respective regimes.  Therefore, only patent applications made after June 8, 1995 will be subject to the 
limitations of the new law. 
20 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 36. 
21 Japan and the signatory nations to the European Patent Convention, including the Germany, France, and 
Great Britain, abide by an 18-month application publication rule.  Effective lobbying by independent   5
significant implications for the use of continuation strategies in patenting, and thus form 
the basis of Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
 
2.1  Strategic Patenting:  Motivations for firms’ use of the Continuation Application 
Because I argue that the strategic use of secrecy in the patenting process is an 
important determinant of continuation applications, and that one motivation for using this 
strategy is to maximize rents from valuable technological improvements, a more nuanced 
discussion of the procedure￿s characteristics of economic interest is necessary.  While the 
literature has discussed ￿submarine￿ patenting, little effort has been directed toward 
understanding the manner in which secrecy, and the complementarities between secrecy 
and patenting, motivates the use of continuation applications.  
  Given the institutional structure of the patent laws, non-disclosure in and of itself 
cannot fully explain strategic uses of the continuation procedure.  Absent other benefits, a 
rent-maximizing applicant seeking secrecy would have few incentives to protect secrecy 
through continuation.  On its face, the added secrecy afforded by the continuation offers 
no advantage over extended and exclusive trade secret protection.  If secrecy were the 
only benefit that continuation provided, an applicant could simply delay filing the 
application,
22 and thus avoid costs associated with patenting￿including the costs 
associated with early USPTO fee payments, agents needed to prepare and prosecute the 
application, and the risks of knowledge spillover from the Patent Office to competitors.   
But the patent applicant does receive a significant benefit from a chain of 
continuations:  the early filing date.  For applicants filing patents through 1994, ￿priority￿ 
and ￿non-disclosure￿ united in continuation patenting to create a strategic opportunity.  
Applicants could retain secrecy for their inventions throughout the application period, and 
a protected priority date created a more valuable secrecy. 
The patent regime in place prior to 1995, moreover, enabled the applicant to 
extend this period of secrecy virtually without limit.
23  For the patenting analyzed in this 
study, the patent term was 17-years after date of issue.  Absent any requirement that 
applications be published,
24 patentees could protect their priority-dates-at-filing for many 
                                                                                                                                                 
inventors resulted in one important loophole:  patent applications made in the United States but not also in 
another jurisdiction requiring 18-month publication are exempted from the U.S. publication requirements. 
22 This delay of filing would be predicated upon the inventor keeping the technology active and in-house, 
thus not running afoul of the provisions of 35 USC § 102(b) (loss of right to patent due to publication, sale, 
or use prior to one year before application date) or  35 USC § 102(c) (loss of right to patent due to 
abandonment).   
23 Due to changes in the Patent Law enacted by the U.S. Congress and effective June 1995, the patent term 
was changed from that which it had been historically, 17-years from the date of patent issue, to 20-years 
from the date of patent application.  This legislation was aimed partly at reducing the incentives for 
applicants to engage in continuation patenting.  These issues raised by this policy change, as well as the 
impacts that the change had upon firms￿ use of continuations, are the subject matter of Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. 
24 A publishing requirement was enacted in the 1999 Inventors Protection Act, which requires that (most) 
applications be published 18-months after filing.  Exceptions are allowed for inventors attesting that patents 
will not be sought in any other country requiring 18-month publication￿such as Japan and most of the EU 
countries.   6
years before beginning the patents￿ faux-monopoly protections.
25  Because continuations 
are new applications based upon their predecessor ￿parent￿ or ￿grandparent￿ applications, 
they may thus incorporate new claims while retaining priority for the core technologies 
disclosed in the first application.  Furthermore, the former application may be freely 
abandoned in order to stop the patent issuing, thus preventing the patent document￿s 
technology disclosures to competitors.  Pursuing a continuation patenting strategy thus 
allowed the applicant to manage the technology and appropriation process, in terms of the 
timing of disclosures and managing technological change.   
 
2.2  The face of continuation practice, 1975-1994 
To shed light upon both strategic and non-strategic uses of  continuation 
applications, continuation patenting data is presented in graphic form below.  In order to 
frame the continuation trend, patenting as a whole in the United States over the 1975-
1994 time period is presented in Figure 2.  Much attention has been paid to increased 
patenting in the US after the mid-1980s (Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001), with suggestions that an increase in ￿junk￿ patenting has played a significant role, 
particularly in the area of new technologies (Aharonian, 2000).  Continuation has been 
touted as a mechanism allowing an applicant to increase the likelihood of patent issue 
(Quillen and Webster, 2001), a premise having implications for firms interested in 
increasing their patent stocks for strategic purposes, such as those using cross-licensing to 
manage the challenges created by patent thickets (Hall and Ziedonis, 2000; Shapiro, 
2001).  If Quillen and Webster￿s hypothesis is sustainable, some of the overall increase in 
patenting may be the result of ￿junk￿ patents issued as a result of strategic continuation 
practice. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Illustrating the overall use of continuations, Figure 3 plots the fraction of patents 
issued in each of the listed years that had at least one continuation
26 in their application 
lineage.  The data thus represent only the terminal patent, the patent that emerges at the 
end of the chain of continuations.  Because some applications may have been abandoned, 
this terminal patent may be the only evidence of a continuation chain.  The data in these 
figures are calculated using the issue-date, not the application-date because, under 
continuation practice, the application-date recorded on the face of the patent document is 
simply the ￿last￿ application in a chain of continuations.  This date is, therefore, an 
artificial measure of inventive activity when continuation applications are filed.  Under 
these circumstances, issue dates may be a more meaningful metric of the use by patentees 
of the procedure, because the issue date is one over which the applicant exercises greater 
                                                 
25 Patents do not offer true monopoly protections because they afford the patentee the right to exclude, and 
not the right to manufacture.  Furthermore, the patent at best offers the patentee control over products, not 
markets. 
26 The use here of ￿continuation￿ includes also the ￿continuation-in-part￿ process by which particular claims 
or groups of claims can be continued as opposed to an entire application and all disclosures therein.  
Because the use of the continuation-in-part process to shroud certain critical claims under a veil of secrecy 
is, in effect, virtually identical to secreting the entire application, both are considered ￿continuations￿ for 
this analysis.  Divisions, which have the same effect as continuations, are considered here also.   7
control than in the ￿normal￿ single-application patent case, and gives an indication of 
when, within a certain distribution, the patentee intends the period of secrecy to end.
27 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
  The numbers presented in Figure 3 suggest that the continuation is an important 
economic phenomenon, accounting for at least 17% and as much as 25% of annual issued 
patents throughout the 1975-1994 period.  The increased incidence of issued continuation 
patents shown after 1986 actually reflects applications that were filed several years 
earlier, prior to the 2-3 year mean pendency for non-continuation applications.  For 
instance, the priority date for continuation patents issued in 1987 and 1988 is almost 4 
years before issue, placing the mean first filing date at 1983 and 1984, respectively.  More 
frequent use of continuation applications by patentees began well before the upturn in 
their issuance demonstrated in Figure 3, and may correspond with the pro-patent legal 
regime ushered in with the founding of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) in 1983 (Kortum & Lerner, 1990; Merges, 1997). 
  Data indicate that the effect of using the continuation application is to delay the 
issue of the patent.  Figure  have had at least one continuation in their application lineage 
and those that are issued with no continuation practice.  Figure 3a offers statistics for the 
entire sample of  1,682,032 patents issued from 1975-1995 inclusive.  Patents issued after 
1995 were dropped to reduce lag issue effects.  While non-continuation patents pend for 
an average of 688 days in the Patent Office, those with at least one continuation in their 
lineage pend for an average of 1442 days￿some 754 days, or 2.1 years, longer.  These 
longer periods of pendency do not appear to be due overwhelmingly to multiple-
continuation applications:  restricting the sample to patents with only one continuation in 
their application lineage yields a mean pendency of 1230 days￿542 days, or 1.5 years, 
longer than those non-continued patents.  Panel B suggests that the length of application 
pendency inside the USPTO, for both continued and non-continued patents, has fallen 
over time, but that continuation applications continue to enjoy significant advantages in 
added pendency. 
 
[Figure 3a about here] 
 
3.  Strategic uses of the continuation application process at the USPTO 
These continuation trends beg a host of questions.  Why did patentees begin to use 
the continuation process in greater numbers during the 1980s through the time when the 
1995 Act was passed?  Was increased use of the procedure primarily fueled by 
￿submarining,￿ or by other motives?  How does the continuation application create 
opportunities for firms to appropriate value from innovations and protect competitive 
advantage?  To aid in answering these questions, I now describe in more detail the 
circumstances under which patentees use continuation practice and derive economic 
benefits from the its use. 
                                                 
27 There will always be a certain amount of uncertainty about the date of issue, although the patentee can 
minimize this uncertainty through the negotiation process with the USPTO examiner and the deft use of the 
continuation process itself.   8
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
The decisions and options available to applicants and examiners during the patent 
negotiation process are presented in Figure 4.  This flow chart can be thought of one in 
which profits and associated probabilities dictate the actions of rational actors.  Players 
can be assumed to maximize their expected payouts.   
In this stylized representation, discovery of a technological advance presents the 
inventor with two options:  to patent or not to patent.  The decision to forego a patent 
likely indicates that the property right is a costly or uncertain option compared to 
alternatives.  In the event that an inventor makes an application, the examiner has two 
options:  to declare the invention either ￿patentable￿ or ￿not patentable.￿  Although this 
decision is presented here as a simple choice, the examiner￿s decision is ordinarily made 
after extensive communication and negotiation with the applicant.  
 
3.1  Unpatentable Inventions 
  If the examiner determines that the application does not describe a patentable 
invention, Figure 4 shows that the applicant is presented with two options:  to terminate 
the application, or to file a continuation application.  An termination ends the process, but 
the continuation application allows the applicant to force another action from the patent 
examiner.  The examiner would again have the option of declaring the application 
patentable or unpatentable, after another period of communication with the applicant and 
information gathering, and so on.  Continuation applications thus offer applicants the 
opportunity to win patents on their inventions despite being declared initially 
￿unpatentable.￿  Two situations may lead to such a altered outcome:  initial mistakes, and 
strategic delay.  
 
3.1.1 Accidental  Continuations 
The filing of a continuation application may be due to misunderstandings between 
the actors￿￿accidental￿ continuations.  Because the continuation allows an applicant to 
correct errors in the claims that come to light during the ￿give and take￿ of the 
prosecution process, some patents that emerge at the end of a continuation chain are the 
result of disagreements concerning patentability and may not be principally motivated by 
a desire for added secrecy.  The continuation process is costly, and because the rational 
applicant would avoid investments in monetary fees and the time entailed, an accidental 
submarine patent, when it occurs, is likely the result of information asymmetries between 
applicants and examiners concerning the patentability of the invention disclosed in the 
pending application.   
Such information asymmetries between the parties are more likely when the 
technology is new or is undergoing an era of rapid change.  When the subject matter of 
the patent is a new or newly changed technology, applicants and their agents, as well as 
the examiners, have had limited time or opportunities to learn.  Parties may thus face 
increased uncertainty about the invention￿s patentability.  In a similar manner, 
information asymmetries can also be expected to increase with technological complexity.  
Applicants with an objectively patentable invention negotiating with an examiner who   9
mistakenly considers the invention unpatentable may use the continuing application to 
capture more time in which to educate the examiner.  From these arguments, the 
following hypotheses may be postulated: 
 
H1a:    Patents are more likely to show a continuation application lineage when 
the technology is new or rapidly changing. 
 
H1b:    Patents are more likely to show a continuation application lineage when 
the technology is complex. 
 
3.1.2  Strategic Delay:  The examination continuation 
Apart from these ￿accidental￿ continuations, the institutional structure of the 
Patent Office may also present a strategic opportunity by allowing the applicant to simply 
delay the process.  By using the continuation, the applicant can postpone the Patent 
Office￿s issue of a ripened patent, or the examiner￿s decision not to issue.  This strategy is 
pursued with the goal of increasing the likelihood of winning patents.  Perverse incentives 
inside the USPTO may make delay a particularly effective lever for improving the 
likelihood of securing patents on inventions that do little to advance the scientific art.  
Merges (1999) identifies an institutional set-up at the USPTO that rewards patent 
examiners for clearing files, and a piece-rate system for examiners that creates incentives 
fostering patent approval.  Lemley (2001) lends some support by suggesting that 
examiners, for a host of reasons, are prone to mistakenly issue patents on objectively 
unpatentable inventions.   
Institutions at the Patent Office may, accordingly, present applicants with 
opportunities to use continuations as a means of delaying patent examiner final 
patentability decisions, thereby improving the likelihood of securing low-quality patents 
(Quillen and Webster, 2001).
28  ￿Junk￿ patents may be particularly valuable in settings
29 
where the sheer number of patents is considered valuable, and may be important for 
purposes other than capturing value from innovation.  In the semiconductor industry, 
negotiations over patent rights or cross-licensing agreements involve the parties 
producing stacks of patents to intimidate competitive rivals.  These negotiations are 
described as a process in which the parties produce a ￿proud list￿ of only a few very 
valuable patents, but also a stack of patents, thus making the absolute number of patents 
quite important.  Hall and Ziedonis (2000) and Shapiro (2001) suggests that, in several 
key industries, among them semiconductors and computer products, patent thickets have 
become the norm, with firms increasingly seeking patents for strategic purposes.  Cross-
licensing ￿thickets￿ of this type have been tied to complex technologies (Somaya, 2000; 
Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2001).  These considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
28 There is some evidence that continuations may also operate as a reward to examiners in the USPTO piece 
rate system.  Such a system may give examiners an incentive to continue negotiations with a patentee over a 
￿close call,￿ thus gaining low-effort rewards through continuation applications.  
29 A preference for more patents may, ceterus pariubus, also work at firm level, insofar as firms use patent 
counts as R&D production indicators or as elements in employee compensation schemes.   10
H2a:  Low-quality patents are more likely to show a continuation application 
lineage. 
 
H2b:  Low-quality patents are more likely to show a continuation application 
lineage in complex technology industries than are those in discrete 
technology industries. 
 
3.2   Patentable Inventions 
  While applicants may file ￿corrective￿ and  ￿delaying￿ continuations when 
presented with an ￿unpatentable￿ finding by the patent examiner, the continuation is also 
an option for applicants presented with a ￿patentable￿ finding by the patent examiner.  If 
the examiner finds that the invention fulfills the statutory requirements of patentability, 
the scheme in Figure 4 shows the applicant having two options:  Allow the patent to 
issue, or file a continuation application.  I argue that benefits stemming from added 
secrecy and the institutional structure of the application process can create an expected 
payoff from continuation that is more valuable to an applicant than immediately allowing 
the patent to issue.
30   
 
3.2.1 Secrecy  Strategy 
Both patenting and secrecy are mechanisms that enable innovators to capture 
value from their knowledge assets.  Although the protection of knowledge assets has long 
been recognized as an important goal of research and development efforts (Scherer, 1965; 
Nordhaus, 1969), firms￿ protection strategies are still not well understood.  For instance, 
in industries where patents are seen by managers as relatively ineffective means of 
appropriating value as compared to secrecy, firms continue to patent, often seeking 
strategic benefit (Levin, et al., 1987; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).  Other firms forego 
patenting and use secrecy as the exclusive means of capturing value from innovations, 
although the mechanisms by which firms create and sustain secrecy are not well 
understood (Brewer, et al., 1996; Liebeskind, 2001).  Despite an extensive literature on 
these mechanisms, the extent to which innovators use secrecy and patenting together has 
been given little attention. 
  Secrecy and patenting have been traditionally viewed as substitute mechanisms 
for capturing value from innovation.  Secrecy, when compared with patenting, has been 
identified both by corporate managers (Levin, et al., 1987) and by corporate R&D labs 
(Cohen, et al., 1997) as a more effective mechanism for appropriating value from 
innovation in numerous industries.  The choice for an inventor is often posed as one 
between preventing ￿reverse engineering￿ by seeking a patent at the cost of disclosing the 
invention through publication following issue (Horstman, et al., 1985).  If the ￿anti-
diffusion￿ effects of secrecy make trade secrecy a substitute for patenting, then the 
economically farsighted inventor who foregoes a patent is determining that the patent is 
                                                 
30 An alternative course is also available￿to simply abandon the application.  This option, to abandon a 
￿patentable￿ invention, is an infrequent event according to practitioners, and is ignored here due to its de 
minimus economic significance.     11
too costly or the reward from it too minimal
31 when compared with the value of the 
invention and the risks of ￿reverse engineering￿ (Friedman, Landes, and Posner, 1991).   
 
 
Given the innovator￿s decision, it is possible to develop a taxonomy of the uses of 
patenting and secrecy, as presented in Figure 5.  This matrix displays the strategic 
positions occupied by the innovating firm after making its choice to use patenting and/or 
secrecy to appropriate value.  The traditional view￿that patents and secrets are 
substitutes￿is illustrated in the lower-left and upper-right quadrants of the matrix.  In 
these ￿naked￿ forms, patenting is associated with disclosure and, conversely, non-
patenting with trade secrecy.
32  Naked patenting has been associated with quick-to-market 
products that display the technological advance readily on the product￿s face.  Examples 
include a wide variety of consumer products.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Cases of the upper-right quadrant, naked trade secrecy, can be found in 
technologies protected exclusively with trade secrecy.  Traditional trade secrecy has been 
associated with process technologies or products with a substantial tacit-knowledge 
component that is difficult if not impossible to translate into a patent application.  These 
innovations can remain hidden, either because the technological advance cannot be read 
on the face of the final product, as is the case with many process technologies which 
leave no signature on the manufactured good, or because the advance is veiled behind 
technological barriers, as in the software industry with product source code.  The 
archetypal example of naked trade secrecy protection is in the process for manufacturing 
chemical products. 
Viewing patenting and secrecy exclusively as substitutes, however, fails to 
recognize the conditions described by the alternative quadrants in Figure 5.  The lower-
right quadrant portrays innovations neither patented nor kept as secrets, a condition which 
can occur when an innovation yields no net benefits given the costs of protection, or 
because the innovator sees the technology as either unprotectable or as the basis for some 
blocking property right in the hands of a competitor.  International Business Machine has 
been following the latter tactic for decades, printing knowledge advances in its 
technology circulars to disclose know-how that the firm chooses not to protect.  These 
motivations are contrasted, however, with the strategies depicted in the upper-left 
quadrant￿those in which patent and secrecy are used together to capture value from 
innovation. 
 
3.2.2  Patenting and Secrecy as Complementary Appropriability Mechanisms 
                                                 
31 The reward may be too thin either because the scope is too narrow, or the length too short.  The inventor 
might also perceive that the invention is unpatentable. 
32 This view parrots the traditional justification for intellectual property protection, that the innovator is 
granted a monopoly for a limited time in exchange for a public disclosure of his knowledge, the latter 
having welfare-increasing spillover effects that rewards society for the monopoly power given the 
innovator.   12
The appropriation strategies described in the top-left quadrant of Figure 5 are 
based on a more nuanced view of the relationship between secrecy and patenting, viewing 
them instead as complementary mechanisms.  Strategies using both patents and secrecy 
contemporaneously to protect different types of knowledge embedded in a technological 
advance were used by firms in the early chemical industry.  Hounshell and Smith￿s (1988) 
study relates how companies in the turn-of-the-twentieth-century German dye industry 
used patents and trade secrets as complements in their strategy to build walls around 
entire research areas.  Arora (1997) suggests that patents and trade secrets can serve as 
complements because of the character of the knowledge inherent in the invention:  tacit 
elements of the knowledge, being difficult to transmit, may be better protected through 
secrecy, while capturing value from the codified knowledge is more effective using patent 
protection.   
Evidence from Cohen, Nelson and Walsh￿s survey (1997) of R&D labs suggests 
that these mechanisms may indeed be used as complements.  Correlations of industry-
level mean effectiveness scores of the various surveyed mechanisms (e.g., lead time, 
secrecy, patenting) demonstrate that in the case of process technologies, the use of these 
two mechanisms are positively correlated at significant levels.  Moreover, factor analyses 
show that, in some circumstances, secrecy loads with patenting, leading the authors to 
suggest that there may be a premium to keeping to-be-patented innovations secret until 
the patent actually issues. (Cohen, et al., 1997).  Another explanation may be that trade 
secrets are being used as a complement to patents. 
The continuation application may allow an applicant to realize this premium, but 
in a different manner than other complementary patent-secrecy strategies.  While 
continuation is similar to the case of the German dye industry described by Hounshell and 
Smith, it is somewhat less complete.  While the German firms were able to leverage full-
blown patent protection with complete trade secret protection on different knowledge 
elements of the same invention, these mechanisms may fail to operate in a continuation 
application.  The continuation strategy instead forces the patent applicant to make a more 
determined choice between patent protection and secrecy, and in this sense suggests that 
the secrecy available under continuation practice covers the same knowledge that is being 
patented, unlike the case of the German dye firms.  Thus, although Arora suggests that 
these types of knowledge are different, one codified and the other tacit, the wide use of 
continuation practice implies that there may be a premium to keeping even patentable￿
and thus codified￿knowledge secret for extended periods.  This may suggest that certain 
firms are choosing to hide their codified, easily-transferable know-how inside the Patent 
Office for extended periods.  It may also suggest that the codified and tacit dichotomy 
used to describe the complementary patent-secret strategy is incomplete, and that instead 
some other dimension is at work. 
To gain a better understanding of the interplay between patent and secrecy choices 
in firm appropriability strategies, I consider two different types of secrecy:  technology 
secrecy, and application secrecy.  Technology secrecy refers to the firms￿ intent￿or 
ability￿to keep knowledge about its technological discovery from spilling outside the 
firm.  Its ability to successfully secret this know-how is often dictated by technological 
characteristics, such as the extent to which the invention is ￿written on the face￿ of the   13
product or process, and the amount of tacit-￿difficult to codify￿-knowledge embedded in 
the discovery.     
Application secrecy, on the other hand, refers to a firm maintaining secrecy over 
the existence of the patent application itself.  The applicant is aided in accomplishing 
application secrecy by the Patent Office, the latter having rules and procedures that 
prevent the agency or examiners from disclosing any pending application.  Recall, also, 
that applications enjoy a common law trade-secret harbor:  the simple act of disclosing a 
discovery to the Patent Office does not prevent the availability of state trade-secret 
protection.  For the firm wanting to disclose the existence of a patent application, the 
Patent Office allows a ￿patent-pending￿ mark to be attached to goods, but requires under 
penalty of law that the applicant must in fact have a patent under examination.  However, 
because there is no requirement that the technology disclosed in the application be made 
public, applicants may still enjoy technology secrecy while disclosing the application’s 
existence to competitors with a ￿patent pending￿ mark. 
 
   [Figure 5a about here] 
 
Strategic positions emerging from the relationship between these two modes of 
secrecy are diagramed on Figure 5a.  The matrix presents four firm strategies, conditioned 
on the firm having selected to patent its discovery, and given different levels of its chosen 
secrecy, subject to its technological constraints.  At low levels of both technology and 
application secrecy, the firm is said to be pursuing a Sprinting strategy.  This strategy is 
appropriate for firms, like Mattel, selling a quick-to-market product with technological 
improvements disclosed on its face.  Such firms are likely to disclose the pending 
application, with a ￿patent-pending￿ mark, as a disincentive to competitors￿ copying, but 
otherwise rely upon the competitive restrictions embodied in the patent once issued and, 
more than likely, on complementary appropriability mechanisms such as lead-time to 
capture value from their invention. 
Submarining describes a strategy sought by firms that possess incentives to 
prevent disclosure of their patent applications but not necessarily of the underlying 
technology.  This strategy can be used to describe George Selden and his ￿Road Engine:￿  
while Selden had substantial incentives to keep his pending patent buried secretly in the 
Patent Office for sixteen years, competitors were openly adopting and making 
complementary investments in Selden￿s invention.  In fact, Selden was ultimately 
enriched by the technological information spillovers:  as a consequence of the 
technology￿s adoption by automakers, Selden was likely able to demand higher royalties 
when he ultimately allowed his patent to issue.  Had there been application disclosure, 
however, Selden may have seen his rents dissipate as competitors instead adopted 
competing technologies not covered by the Selden patent, or innovated in novel areas, 
thus reducing Selden￿s hold-up opportunities.  An example of the Submarining strategy in 
the software sector can be found disclosed in the Rambus, Inc. litigation.  Rambus, while 
disclosing technologies as member of the industry board setting DRAM chip-interface 
standards, kept the existence of its covering patent application secret.  When Rambus 
finally allowed the patent to issue from the continuation application process, it claimed 
that competitors were infringing, prompting firms who also participated in the standard-  14
setting process￿Hyundai Electonics, Infineon Technologies, and Micron Technology￿
to take Rambus to the court. 
When technology secrecy is technically feasible and an objective of the firm, firm 
strategies are as described on the left-hand side of Figure 5a.  Firms choosing to disclose 
the existence of a patent application to competitors while still enjoying secrecy over the 
discovered technology are described as pursuing an Emptying strategy.  This strategy may 
be pursued to ￿clear the field￿ of potential innovators in a technology space.  For products 
or processes with technological characteristics which make technology secrecy possible, a 
￿patent pending￿ mark may introduce sufficient uncertainty into the marketplace to keep 
competitors from pursuing follow-on innovations.  This uncertainty may take the form of 
market or technology uncertainty, but has the effect of making the net benefits from 
follow-on innovation less transparent to competitors, particularly given the existence of 
an as-yet-undefined patent in the technology space.   
The last category displayed on the matrix, Optioning strategy, is enabled by high 
levels of both application and technology secrecy.  In Optioning, firms may be taking 
advantage of the opportunity that its technology secrecy affords it to pursue follow-on 
innovations in the shadow of secrecy, while concurrently choosing to maximize the 
information asymmetries to competing firms by foregoing the ￿patent-pending￿ mark.  
Thus, the patent application may be an option taken-out by the firm to fix its priority of 
invention and ensure that rents may be captured from the early innovation within a larger 
strategy of technology￿and application￿secrecy as the optimal strategy chosen by the 
firm as a means of capturing value from the fruits of the technology trajectory, which the 
firms intends to own. 
I frame these left-side strategies, Emptying and Optioning, within a broader 
context of sequential innovation, although these strategies may also have utility in 
preventing competitors from inventing-around an innovation by raising search costs.  I 
argue that these strategies have more relevance when the innovating firm has embarked 
on a research agenda with the aim of securing valuable follow-on discoveries.  I formalize 
the economics underpinning the innovating firm￿s decision by presenting the following 
simple two-firm model derived from Green & Scotchmer (1995).   
Consider two products, the first with quality x and the second with quality x + y, 
such that the incremental improved-quality of the second is y.  Assume that x and y are 
related to the consumer￿s willingness to pay such that the revenue to the monopolist 
producing the lead innovation is ππππ x and to the monopolist controlling also the follow-on 
innovation is ππππ x+y.  The net benefits to the monopolist producing the first and second 
inventions are thus ππππ x – c1 and ππππ x+y – c2 , respectively.  The net benefits to firms 
producing these goods in competition are ππππ  
c
x – c1 and ππππ   
c
y – c2, and, by assumption, ππππ x  
≥  ππππ  
c
x and ππππ x+y ≥  ππππ  
c
x + ππππ   
c
y. 
Considering the setting in which Firm 1 (F1) discovers x and Firm 2 (F2) 
discovers the improvement y, Figure 6 presents the sequence of decisions and payoffs.  
The schematic makes it apparent that, because ππππ x  ≥  ππππ  
c
x , F1 prefers to be at the left node 
when the game is completed, producing product x as the monopolist.  It is thus in F1￿s 
interest that F2 foregoes innovation in y, and accordingly F1 can create disincentives for 
F2 by pushing F2￿s expected net benefits to  0 ≥  ππππ   
c
y – c2 .  F1 can accomplish this   15
objective by driving F2￿s innovation costs c2 upward or by depressing F2￿s expectations 
over its revenues ππππ   
c
y.   
The strategies on the left-hand side of the matrix presented in Figure 5a present 
the firm with an opportunity to accomplish these objectives.  Technology secrecy, by its 
nature, introduces uncertainty and information asymmetries into the innovation process 
on the technology path, having the effect of driving the costs of follow-on innovation 
upward for competitors.  These costs may be magnified by the announcement of a 
￿patent-pending￿ which introduces a hazard￿with hidden and as-yet-to-be-determined 
boundaries￿into the technology landscape.   
By the same token, technology secrecy or the announcement of a ￿patent-pending￿ 
may serve to introduce uncertainty and thus lower a competitor￿s expected profits from 
the follow-on innovation ππππ   
c
y, thus lowering the competitor￿s net benefit from investing 
in discovery.  Again, the technological characteristics of the invention will likely drive 
the choice of these available strategies:  process discoveries may be particularly prone to 
the use of Optioning because information asymmetries may be heightened with these 
technologies veiled within the firm, while product discoveries, the existence of which 
will necessarily be known when marketed, may invite the use of Emptying.  The most 
favorable outcome for F1 may indeed be to pursue the necessary investment in y itself, 
potentially enjoying a lower cost to innovation c2￿ where c2  ≥   c2￿ and the monopolist￿s 
revenue ππππ x+y. 
While each of the continuation strategies displayed in Figure 5a requires the 
applicant to choose between patent protection and secrecy, these are not simply 
substitution strategies.  The continuation in fact allows firms to choose strategies to 
realize overlapping benefits from secrecy, retaining all the protections available under 
trade secrecy (protected by law during pendency of the application) along with one 
important benefit￿early priority￿available to the first-in-time applicant to the Patent 
Office.  By using the continuation, patentees gain benefits from both mechanisms, 
bypassing in some sense the classic quid pro quo demanded by the patent system, that 
innovators are awarded a monopoly in exchange for disclosure.   
Thus, as in the case of the German dye manufacturers, firms using the 
continuation strategy today are using both patent and secrecy in a complementary fashion, 
albeit in a decidedly different manner than those early chemical firms.  For firms pursuing 
a Submarine strategy, benefits are reasonably straightforward:  they seek to capture rents 
from later-adopting firms that infringe the later-issuing patent.  For other firms using the 
continuation strategy, benefits can be different, stemming instead from the different 
opportunities made available through technology and application secrecy.  These may 
include an extended period of time in which to manage the burgeoning technology out of 
the light of day as a means of gaining competitive advantage over rivals, or even added 
time to secretly develop complementary capabilities or technologies upon which 
successful commercialization of the initial technology relies.
33  The foregoing allows the 
formulation of the following hypotheses: 
                                                 
33 It may be, in fact, that the institutional structure of modern U.S. patent law may make the German dye 
firms￿ strategy difficult as compared to a continuation strategy that requires disclosure at some point in the 
patenting process.  Arora (1997) points to the fact that the early German dye industry was operating under   16
 
H3a:  Patentees are more likely to file a continuation application when operating in an 
industry that highly values secrecy as an appropriability mechanism. 
 
H3b:  Patentees are more likely to file a continuation application when the patentee 
demonstrates control over the technological trajectory.  
 
 
3.2.3 Submarine  Patents 
  I argue here that innovators pursue a continuation patenting strategy to protect an 
extended secrecy, thus allowing the innovator to capture added value from a 
technological improvement.  The Submarining strategy used by George Selden in 
prosecuting his ￿Road Engine￿ can be viewed as an extreme form of this secrecy strategy.   
Patents that issue after extended periods of continuation secrecy are often called 
￿submarine￿ patents.  A Submarine is as a pejorative term for a patent, like George 
Selden￿s, that combines extended secrecy with economic hold-up.  The archetypical 
example of the ￿hold-up submarine￿ is a patent that, after having languished in the patent 
office for many years, is released into a marketplace in which competitors are extensively 
using the patented technology.  The applicant has the opportunity to observe the 
technology develop over time and use the continuation process to subtly alter the claims 
of the pending application to fit the advancing technology￿so long as no ￿new￿ matter is 
added in the process.  When the applicant ultimately allows the submarine patent to 
surface, competitors may be held hostage to the owner of the fresh property right.  
Competitors using the technology may be willing to settle even in the face of a patentee￿s 
questionable claims to invention:  the cost of extended legal battles￿coupled with the 
risk of an injunction order suspending the firm￿s operations￿may justify settling, 
regardless of the quality of the patentee￿s claim.   
The matrix displayed in Figure 5a suggests that the Submarine strategy is reliant 
upon application secrecy, but that technology secrecy is not necessary, and indeed that 
disclosure may increase the likelihood of swift adoption by competitors, thus increasing 
the present value of future rent streams.  By way of explanation, consider the following 
submarine strategy.  Firm 1 (F1) applies for a patent on its discovery at time t0 and 
thereafter uses the continuation application process to keep the application secret while 
other competitors Firms 2 and 3 (F2 & F3) adopt the technology at times t1 and t2.  The 
continuation application process may be used by F1 to alter the wording of the claims to 
better capture the observed uses to which these later-adopters F2 and F3 are putting the 
technology in the marketplace, each ignorant of the pending patent due to the maintained 
application secrecy of F1.  During the period after t1 but prior to the patent￿s issue at t3, 
                                                                                                                                                 
an institutional structure that supported the maintenance of both patent and trade secret protection upon the 
knowledge underlying an invention.  The patent law in the United States, however, requires the patent 
applicant to disclose the invention so as to ￿enable￿ one skilled in the art to make and use the invention.  35 
USC 112 (2000).  This ￿enablement￿ requirement limits the ability of a patentee to use both full-blown 
patent and trade secret protections for a single invention contemporaneously, thus increasing the value of 
using continuation practice for extending the period of pre-issue secrecy.  This distinction suggests that, in 
the United States, continuation strategies are more likely to be characteristic of patent-secrecy strategies 
portrayed in Figure 3.   17
the adopters F2 and F3 may develop valuable follow-on technologies or deploy assets 
alongside the adopted technology, making specific investments that open them to hold-up 
by F1 when the patent issues and gives the patentee the right to exclude uses by the 
adopters throughout the patent term.
34  This situation is not fanciful, instead having been 
modeled after a real-world example of this type of submarine strategy:  bar-coding patents 
that lay submerged for decades were used by patentee Jerome Lemelson to collect 
royalties from both semiconductor and automobile manufacturers in much the same 
manner as Selden had done with his ￿Road Engine￿ a century earlier.
35   
 
 
5.  Data and Methodology 
The data source used to identify patents issued at the end of a chain of 
continuations is the Micropatent Database.  The data include 266,066 firm-assigned and 
continued patents during the period 1975-1994.  Because this study is primarily aimed at 
understanding firm strategies, the sample of patents is restricted to those assigned to 
corporate entities￿assigned patents not assigned to individuals or governments￿
following the definitions in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001).  The sample is further 
restricted to include only patents issued prior to 1995 to correct for any effects of the 
1995 amendments to the Patent Act which were intended to significantly alter the 
incentives for seeking the continuation application. 
Information concerning continuation applications and associated dates is collected 
from a text field on the face of the patent document styled ￿Related Patent Data￿ by the 
USPTO.  A ￿continuation￿ patent is defined as any patent containing the term 
￿continuation￿ or ￿division￿ in this field.
36  Other information beyond the scope of the 
statutorily defined terms continuation and division is not contained in the ￿Related Patent 
Data￿ field.   Information on a range of characteristics for both continued and non-
continued patents was collected from the Micropatent Database, the NBER patent 
database (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001), Derwent Information, and the United States 
Patent and Trademake Office.  Data is generally available on the range of patent-based 
measures beginning in 1975.  My data includes 1,258,880 issued patents assigned to 
entities during the period 1975-1994.   
The unit of analysis in this study is an issued United States patent.  Many studies 
have used the issued patent as a unit of analysis despite the fact that inventive activity is 
the phenomenon of interest.  In this study, I am principally interested in patenting 
behavior, not inventive activity, and so the unit of analysis is appropriate.  I note at the 
outset that any decision to seek a continuation is contingent upon a decision to apply for 
                                                 
34 The institutional set-up dictating the rules of the game to the adopters prior to the issue of a patent are 
important to consider.  In Figure 1, the uses of the patented technology prior to t3 are ￿free￿ to 1
st User and 
2
nd User because the t3 patentee is precluded from collecting rents from uses prior to the issue of the 
property right.  Furthermore, in the event that an adoption later than t0 but prior to t3 is accompanied by an 
application for patent by 1
st User or 2
nd User, an attentive Patent Office is likely to adjudicate the dispute 
over priority and rights to the patent on the innovation in an ￿interference￿ proceeding.  The ￿interference￿ 
would give both parties notice of the other applicant￿s disclosure, with the result being a conclusion that one 
of the applicants has actual priority-in-time and, thus, is entitled to the patent. 
35 Id. 
36 By including the term ￿continuation,￿ ￿continuation-in-part￿ patents were also captured.   18
the patent, although the availability of the continuation as an option may effect the 
likelihood of the initial decision to apply for the patent.  Moreover, the availability and 
benefits of secrecy protection, as well as the perceived stance of the Courts and the Patent 
Office as regards patentability, may bias the types of patents that make their way into the 
system. 
 
5.1  Accidental Continuations:  Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
I begin the discussion of independent variables by discussing those associated 
with asymmetric information, namely AGE, and ORIGINALITY.  The variable AGE is 
constructed by measuring the average age of the citations contained on the face of an 
issued patent.  AGE is considered a proxy for the age of the technology underlying the 
patented invention (Lowe, 2001).  This measure proxies for uncertainty in that ￿newer￿ 
technologies are likely to be characterized by greater uncertainty than are older, more 
established technologies.  The variable ORIGINALITY proxies for the range of 
technologies with which the inventor and examiner must be familiar in order to 
understand the disclosure.  This variable was first given by Trajtenberg, Jaffe, and 
Henderson (1997) and is the Herfendahl concentration index giving the percentage of 
citations made by a patent that belong to a breadth of different classes.  A high value in 
ORIGINALITY demonstrates that the patents cited by patent i belong to a wide range of 
patent classes, and are said here to be indicative of higher complexity.  
 
5.1  Strategic Delay:  Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
I test for continuations used as a mechanism for strategic delay by using a 
definition of ￿complex￿ and ￿discrete￿ technologies following Kusonaki, Nonaka, and 
Nagata (1998).  Cohen et al. suggests that the key distinction between these two types of 
technologies is whether the new commercializable product is composed of many￿
￿complex￿￿or few￿￿discrete￿￿patentable elements.  Archetypal examples of complex 
and discrete industries are electronic products and chemicals, respectively.  In ￿complex￿ 
product industries, firms are less likely to control the patents covering all the 
complementary components, and thus are more prone to cross-licensing negotiations than 
are firms producing ￿discrete￿ products.  I operationalize this distinction by coding 
patents by sector:  Drugs/health (DH); Chemical (CH); Electronics (EL); and 
Mechanicals (ME).  The sector indicators are dummies after Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(1997), defined as follows:  Drugs & Heath, International Patent Classes (IPC) A61 and 
A01N; Chemicals, IPC A62, B31, C01-20, D; Electronics, IPC G01-21, H; and 
Mechanical, IPC B21-68 except B31, C21-30, E01-F40.  Drugs & Health and Chemicals 
will, following Kusonaki, Nonaka, and Nagata (1998), proxy for discrete technologies, 
while Electronic and Mechanical will proxy for complex technologies. 
The definition of ￿low-quality￿ patents is problematical, due to the fact that the 
available indicators of value are latent.  I propose to use the forward citation measure 
which has been shown to correlate with other indicators of value (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 1997; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2000).  I code the patent data by 
assigning patents to one of three categories:  those patents that received fewer than the 
mean number of citations in each of the broad industrial sectors (Drugs, Chemicals, 
Electrical, Mechanical) in a five-year forward window measured from the issue date (F01,   19
patents receiving either zero or one forward citation); those patents receiving more than 
the mean number of citations in each of these broad industrial sectors for the identically-
defined window (F4mo, patents receiving four or more forward citations); and all other 
patents (F23, patents receiving either two or three forward citations).  The first and 
second measures are intended to proxy for low-quality and high-quality patents, 
respectively.  I am cognizant that this proxy is likely to contaminate the sample by 
introducing some valuable patents with long latency periods.  I will test for Hypothesis 2b 
by determining whether low-quality patents are more likely to show a continuation 
application lineage, ceterus paribus, in ￿complex￿ product industries than in ￿discrete￿ 
product industries. 
 
6.2  Secrecy Continuations:  Hypothesis 3 
To test for complementarities between patenting and secrecy, I rely principally 
upon the responses in the Carnegie-Mellon Survey (CMS) (Cohen, et. al, 1997) as an 
indicator of the importance of secrecy in various sectors.  Because the CMS elicited 
responses only from R&D managers at firms, my assigned-patent restriction is again 
appropriate.  A ￿firm￿ patent is defined by reference to the NBER database, using codes 
that limit the sample to patents assigned to non-governmental organizations, a definition 
that tends to include some organizations that are not corporations.  These defined ￿firm￿ 
patents comprise 78.4% of all patenting 1963-99 (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001).  
The CMS was limited to industries in 34 separate ISIC codes.  From the 
population of firm patents, I truncated on the right for patents issued after 1994 to allow 
me to construct measures consistently and also to mitigate the effects of the 1995 regime 
change on firms￿ patenting behavior.  Between 1975 and 1994, a total of 266,066 patents 
have been issued showing some use of continuation practice in their application lineage.  
Issued patents are coded ￿continued￿ if the Micropatent Database shows at least one 
continuation, continuation-in-part, or division in the patent￿s application lineage.   
  I will conduct a multivariate test that permits me to test for the existence of  
complementarities between patenting and secrecy in continuation practice while also 
allowing me to incorporate other independent variables.  I test for the effects of firms￿ 
valuing secrecy as an appropriability mechanism on the likelihood of a patenting firm 
using the continuation process while, concurrently, considering asymmetric information 
and strategic delay explanations for increased likelihood of continuation use.  I specify a 
binomial logit model, in which the dependent variable CDCIP=1 if the issued patent 
shows either a continuation, a division, or a continuation-in-part in its application lineage, 
and CDCIP=0 otherwise. 
  Accordingly, I let y* = Xiβ + ￿i where y* is the latent variable reflecting the 
decision to employ the continuation application procedure.  A continuation will thus be 
observed when y* > 0 but not when y* ≤0.  Using standard assumptions for ￿i allows me 
to specify a logit model.  Firm decisions to file more than one continuation on a single 
issued patent are treated identically to those in which we see a single continuation being 
filed. 
  I construct a set of independent variables from the CMS associated with my 
theory on complementarities between patenting and secrecy.  I use the variable SELFCT 
as a measure of the percentage of forward citations made by patent i to patents assigned to   20
the same assignee.  This measure proxies for the patent holder￿s control over the 
technological trajectory and is indicative of the patentee￿s exclusion of competitors from 
the technology path on which patent i lies.  My principal measure indicating the 
importance of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism to individual patentees is derived 
from the CMS (Cohen, et al. 1997) and styled SECRET.  The variable SECRET is 
constructed using the responses reported in the CMS, matching individual patents to the 
34 ISIC codes used as the basis for classification in the survey.  Patent-ISIC matching was 
performed using the Statistics Canada-based concordance produced by Brian Silverman 
(1994).  While Silverman used a distribution of international-patent-classed (IPC) 
Canadian patents to match with USSIC codes, the CMS grounding in the ISIC required 
me to back out the Silverman concordance and match these IPC-assigned patents instead 
to the ISIC.  For this purpose I used the NTIS CSIC-ISIC concordance available from the 
United States Commerce Department. 
 
 
 
6.  Results 
 
TBD  [Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 about here] 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
TBD 
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FIGURE 3:  Continuation patents, share of all 
issued patents, 1975-94
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Figure 3a:  Issue lags, Non-continued and
Continued patents, 1975-94 (in years)
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FIGURE 5:  Uses of Patenting and Secrecy  28
 